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Do Financial Incentives Affect the Quality of
Expert Performance? Evidence from the
Racetrack
Abstract
Does the quality of performance by experts respond to financial incen-
tives? I provide some new evidence on this question by examining the
propensity of racehorse trainers to undertake effort-diverting actions.
In a sample of 30426 horse races, I find that lower race stakes are
strongly associated with more unexpected outcomes, consistent with
more trainers exerting less-than-full effort in such races. These results
continue to hold when low-information races are excluded from the
sample, thereby ruling out the possibility that stake is simply a proxy
for the level of information that is available to bettors. Moreover, in
a sub-sample of 4416 races for which final odds data are available, the
dispersion in odds is positively related to race stake, consistent with
rational bettors recognising the incentives faced by trainers and incor-
porating this insight in their investments. As a group, horse trainers
apparently tailor the quality of their services to the potential size of
their remuneration from clients.
1 INTRODUCTION
Racetrack gambling data have been widely used to draw inferences about
market efficiency and investor risk preferences; see for example Sauer (1998)
and the collections of Hausch et al (1994) and Vaughan Williams (2003). In
this paper, I suggest that such data can also be useful for shedding light
on other aspects of agent behaviour. Specifically, I exploit a simple link
between racehorse trainer effort and the predictability of race outcomes in
order to shed light on the ability of financial incentives to motivate high
quality performance.
The literature examining the relationship between financial incentives
and performance has yielded mixed results. On the one hand, several re-
cent studies document a strong output response to the provision of financial
incentives for workers. For example, Lazear (2000), Paarsch and Shearer
(2000), and Shearer (2004) all find that output is significantly greater when
workers are paid piece rates rather than fixed wages. This evidence suggests
that the potential for greater financial returns motivates greater effort and
productivity, just as economic theory predicts. On the other hand, there
is considerably more doubt about the sensitivity of performance quality to
incentives - the extent to which greater payoffs motivate workers to produce
better, as well as more, goods and services. This issue is particularly germane
to the class of professional workers who use specialized knowledge, informa-
tion and skills to provide quality-oriented expert services to clients. Because
experts are typically members of a profession, they are likely to have high
intrinsic motivation related to this membership; such “professional pride”
considerations potentially dampen the impact of financial incentives on per-
formance quality. Indeed, psychologists such as Kohn (1993a, 1993b) reject
the idea that money can motivate quality-oriented tasks, a view generally
supported by laboratory evidence: in a meta-analysis of 39 experiments un-
dertaken between 1975 and 1996, Jenkins et al (1998) are unable to detect
any significant relationship between financial incentives and the quality of
performance. Away from the laboratory, some evidence for the view that
financial incentives matter comes from standard agency settings: Levitt and
Syverson (2005) and Rutherford et al (2005) find that real estate agents per-
form better when selling their own houses than when selling on behalf of
clients, while Michaely and Womack (1999) and Barber et al (2007) report
that the quality of stock analysis provided to clients is adversely affected by
the existence of an investment banking relationship between the analyst’s
firm and the firm whose securities it is scrutinising.
The training of race horses provides an ideal setting for further examin-
ing the role of financial incentives in eliciting quality performance. Trainers
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are experts who prepare horses for racing on behalf of clients; the services
they provide include not only physically working with the horses, but also the
planning of training and racing schedules, engaging and instructing raceday
drivers or jockeys, employing and assigning stablehands, choosing the appro-
priate racing equipment, and so on. In return, trainers receive daily fees plus
a percentage of horse winnings (10% in the case analysed here). Because the
latter component is not as valuable in low-stakes races, they stand to gain
less from clients whose horses compete in such races. For such clients, ex-
ertion of “full effort” is less financially attractive, so the trainer may choose
to pursue other objectives, e.g., additional leisure, devoting more attention
to other stable horses, or maximising personal betting payoffs.1 By contrast,
such effort-diverting actions carry a greater opportunity cost in high-stakes
races, suggesting that trainers are then more likely to exert full effort.
In this paper, I address the following question: do higher race stakes re-
duce the propensity for horse trainers to engage in effort-diverting activities?
I do so by exploiting the simple intuition that the presence of less-than-full
effort by trainers will be associated with more “unexpected” outcomes on
average.2 In handicapping any race, the betting public uses a vast array of
information: expert opinion and advice, perceived horse quality based on
prior performance, stable reputation, driver reputation, barrier draw, and
so on. Most studies of racetrack betting conclude that markets are broadly
efficient with respect to such publicly-available information (for an overview,
see Sauer, 1998), but various anomalies suggest that private information may
not be fully incorporated in odds (e.g., Crafts, 1985; Gabriel and Marsden,
1990; Shin, 1993). In this context, a particularly important piece of private
information is the extent to which a horse’s trainer exerts maximum effort
in preparing it for that race, i.e., how hard is the stable trying to win? A
trainer might, for example, decide to use the race primarily as a practice or
experimental run and so under- or over-work a horse in the days leading up
to the race; or, perhaps motivated by the betting considerations described
above, he may entrust the horse’s care to a junior stablehand, or issue the
raceday driver or jockey with unhelpful instructions. In general, such “inside
information” is unobservable to bettors, and so little of it is impounded in
1For example, the trainer may intend to bet on another trainer’s horse in the same race
and so maximises the probability of that bet succeeding by making his own horse less of a
factor. Or he may hope to reap a large betting payoff on the horse in a future race by first
improving its odds with a lacklustre performance in the current race. Shin (1992) cites an
acknowledgement by United Kingdom racing officials of the prevalence of such practices.
2An alternative approach would be to use some direct measure of performance – such
as the time taken to run a particular distance. However, the sensitivity of race times
to weather, track surface and, particularly, race tactics, means that such an approach is
unlikely to be useful.
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betting odds.3
If the weaker financial incentives associated with low-stakes races re-
sult in trainers being more likely to choose less-than-full effort, then bettor
odds will be a less reliable predictor of the outcomes of such races, since bet-
tors are missing relevant information. By contrast, the greater opportunity
cost of exerting less-than-full effort in high-stakes races means that private
information about trainer effort should be less significant, hence ensuring a
closer convergence between bettor odds and race outcomes. In short, race
outcomes become more “predictable” to bettors (given the information they
have available) as race stakes increase, and thus favoured horses – which offer
smaller bettor payoffs – succeed more often.
This situation is depicted in Figure 1. The two circles represent the
total amounts of information relevant to predicting the outcome of low- and
high-stakes races respectively. In the low stakes race, some trainers exert
less-than-full effort because of more attractive alternatives elsewhere (such
as increased leisure or profitable betting activities), and so a relatively large
proportion of the relevant information is unavailable to bettors. As a result,
some horses will be over-bet and others under-bet, and unexpected outcomes
(i.e., high payoffs to successful bettors) will be relatively common. But in
the high-stakes race, most trainers do their best, so the quantity of private
information is relatively small. Bettor odds thus reflect a greater proportion
of the relevant information and unexpected race outcomes are less common.
To explore this idea, I test the following two hypotheses: if horse train-
ers respond to financial incentives by exerting less effort in races with low
stakes, then (i) the average payoff (per unit of investment) received by suc-
cessful bettors should decrease in race stakes, and (ii) the success rate of
betting “favourites” (i.e., the horses with the most bettor money invested on
them) should increase in race stakes. Put more succinctly, horses that are
relatively heavily backed by bettors, and thus offer lower payoffs, should suc-
ceed more often in high-stakes races. Of course, such tests cannot identify
differential effort by individual trainers, but they should reveal something
about the propensities of trainers as a group.
3Of course, insiders (employees and other connections of the trainer’s stable) will often
have this information and can be expected to utilise it by exploiting any bet mis-pricing
on the part of the public. If this information advantage were fully impounded in odds,
then there would be no reason to suspect that race predictability would differ with race
stake, and thus would be unable to shed any light on trainer incentives. However, such
impounding is likely to be limited by insider capital constraints. Indeed, insider betting
seems to typically constitute only a small proportion of the total amount bet - Shin (1993)
and Coleman (2007) both arrive at estimates of approximately 2% - and, as previous stud-
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Figure 1: Proportion of Information Available to Bettors if Trainer Effort
Depends on Race Stake.
In a sample of 30426 horse races, I detect a strong relationship between
race stakes and payoffs to successful bettors: after controlling for other fac-
tors that systematically affect race outcomes, a doubling of the race stake
is associated with a decrease in bettor payoffs of between 8% and 14%, de-
pending on the betting pool. Similarly, the success rates of bettor-favourite
horses increase significantly with the size of the race stake. Importantly, I
obtain essentially the same results in sub-samples that exclude races about
which bettors seem likely to have relatively little information, thereby sug-
gesting that race stake is not simply proxying for the quantity and quality
of information available to bettors.
Although this evidence is consistent with horse trainers tailoring the
quality of their performance to the potential size of their remuneration from
clients, it cannot rule out other possibilities. For example, race stake may
be correlated with some unknown determinant of race outcomes, thereby
rendering my results potentially spurious. In these circumstances, it is im-
portant to look for other evidence that is also consistent with stake-induced
differential effort. One example of such evidence is the relationship between
betting odds and race stake. If trainers are motivated by differential stake
levels, then rational bettors will be aware of these incentives and hence re-
spond by setting less dispersed odds in low-stakes races. In a sub-sample of
races for which full-field odds data are available, I find that this is indeed the
case: a 10% higher stake leads to a 10.3 point rise in the standard deviation
of race odds. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect is the same across both
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low- and high-experience-horse races, so race stake is not acting as a proxy
for the level of information bettors have about horse abilities.
In the next section, I describe the data used in this paper and under-
take some preliminary analysis. Section 3 examines the relationship between
stakes and race outcomes, and contains the results from a series of multiple
regression models that are the paper’s primary focus. Section 4 focuses on
the relationship between stakes and final betting odds, while section 5 offers
some concluding remarks.
2 DATA AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
The data sample consists of 30426 standardbred (harness) races held in New
Zealand between 1993 and 2006 for which full information is available.4 These
races were staged at 56 tracks spread across the entire country, although
more than a third of them took place at the two major tracks located in
Auckland and Christchurch. Since 1996, New Zealand has had both fixed-
odds (bookmaker) and totalisator (pari-mutuel) betting options, but most
investment takes place via the latter. Total betting on the races in my
sample was approximately $3.5 billion.5
For each race, I recorded both the total prizemoney at stake and the
payoffs to successful investors in three totalisator betting pools: win, quinella
and trifecta. Moving from win to quinella to trifecta payoffs yields an increas-
ingly broad measure of the extent to which a race corresponds to bettors’
expectations. For example, a strongly favoured horse could win the race and
yield a small win pool payoff - indicating that the result was highly pre-
dictable - but be followed home by two outsiders resulting in a large trifecta
pool payoff - indicating that the result was unexpected. By using all three
payoff measures, I am able to better assess whether the hypothesized rela-
tionship between betting payoffs and race stakes is robust. I also recorded
the success of the betting favourite (i.e., the horse that attracted the most
investment) in two pools: win and place. The win favourite was deemed to
be successful if and only if it won; the place favourite was successful if and
only if it finished in the first three.
Table 1 provides some summary statistics for the variables used in this
study. Betting payoffs are expressed relative to a $1 unit of investment,
i.e., a $10 payoff equals $1 return of investment plus $9 winnings. The
4These data were obtained from Harness Racing New Zealand, whose website
(www.hrnz.co.nz) contains information on the outcome of every race held in New Zealand
since 1985, including, since 1993, details of payoffs to winning bettors. A further 330 races
had missing or non-existent data, and so were deleted from the sample.
5All monetary values are in New Zealand dollars.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Min Median Max
(Standard Deviation)
Race Stake ($) 8019 1000 5000 750000
(15454)
Win Payoff ($) 8.60 1.00 5.45 173.70
(9.71)
Quinella Payoff ($) 44.65 1.05 21.30 2103.35
(72.89)
Trifecta Payoff ($) 1055.00 2.10 307.50 398606
(4023.36)
Field Size 11.73 4 12 18
(2.32)
Unpredictability Index 0.672 0 1 3
(0.71)
Win Favourite Success Rate 0.335
Place Favourite Success Rate 0.610
three payoff variables display considerable dispersion, e.g., the mean trifecta
payoff is $1055, but the sample contains payoffs ranging from $2.10 to almost
$400,000. Race stakes are similarly variable: the mean stake is $8019, but
individual stakes range from $1000 to $750,000. However, the difference
between the 5th and 95th stake percentiles is only $16000, so the potential
gains to trainers from stake-dependent effort are, across most races, quite
small. All four variables exhibit significant skewness, with means that are
considerably greater than medians.6 Win favourites win approximately one
third of all races, while place favourites successfully finish in the first three
61% of the time.
To investigate the relation between race stakes and betting payoffs (or
favourite success rates), one variable that must be controlled for is the number
of horses in the race, since a bigger field makes it less likely that any given
horse – or combination of horses – will succeed. All else equal, bigger fields
should lead to higher winning payoffs on average, particularly in the quinella
and trifecta pools.
I also control for the inherent “unpredictability” of a race. Regardless
of stake and field size, some races are simply more difficult to handicap than
others, resulting in a greater number of unexpected outcomes that are as-
sociated with lower favourite success rates and higher betting payoffs. For
standardbred horse races, three factors stand out. First, although most races
in my sample are run on all-weather surfaces, a significant minority (approx-
imately 12.5%) take place on grass. Grass track races are often more difficult
6In the case of the payoff variables, this is partly due to the Totalisator Agency Board
(the sole legal outlet for betting on horse races in New Zealand) guaranteeing a minimum
payoff of $1.
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to handicap for several reasons: horses are less experienced at racing on
grass, bettors have less information about horses’ relative prowess on grass,
and grass tracks offer a less homogeneous racing surface that may randomly
affect some horses in any race. Second, approximately 10% of the races in
the sample are run on rain-affected tracks. This affects different horses in
different ways, but often tends to neutralise the advantages of high-speed
horses, thus making the outcome more difficult for bettors to predict. Third,
although the majority of races in my data begin from a mobile dispatch
(where the horses are already moving at close to race speed at the point
where the race starts), approximately 44% are standing start races (where
the horses must stand quietly and begin from a stationary position). The lat-
ter feature introduces an additional random element because horses are more
likely to deviate from the correct gait (i.e., racing action) when forced to be-
gin quickly from a stationary position, potentially resulting in considerable
loss of ground or disqualification.7
To quantify these features in a form amenable to empirical analysis,
I construct an index that adds 1 for each of the above features that a race
possesses. For example, a race that is run on a wet grass surface from a
standing start has an index value of 3, while a race that is run on a dry grass
surface from a mobile start is given an index value of 1. Races with none of
these features have an index value of 0.8
Table 2 provides some preliminary analysis of the relation between race
stakes and betting payoffs. I first split the sample into races above and below
the median stake and calculate average betting payoffs and favourite success
rates for each group. Average payoffs are higher, and favourite success rates
are lower, in lower-stakes races, and these differences are strongly statistically
significant (at the 0.1% level or better). Quantitatively, the differences are
greatest in the more exotic bet pools - the average trifecta dividend in races
with stakes above the sample median is only 82% of the average dividend in
races with stakes below the sample median.
I also calculate the correlation between, on the one hand, the race
stake, and on the other hand, the payoff and success rate variables. Partly to
eliminate the skewness, and partly because any impact of stakes on betting
payoff seems likely to be non-linear, I use the natural log of the race stake
7As pointed out by the referee, a further source of uncertainty potentially stems from
the presence of previously high-quality horses appearing in low-stakes races, and the un-
derlying reasons for their apparent form decline. However, the New Zealand harness
handicapping system provides very few opportunities for horses to drop back in class;
such horses are typically retired or sold to countries where a greater range of abilities is
catered for.
8Models that include these three features as separate variables yield very similar overall
results, so I report only the results from the more parsimonious index approach.
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Table 2: Preliminary Analysis
Above Median Below Median Difference Correlation with
Race Stake Race Stake Race Stake
Average Win Payoff ($) 8.28 8.93 −0.65 −0.25
Average Quinella Payoff ($) 42.13 47.15 −5.02 −0.27
Average Trifecta Payoff ($) 951.51 1157.92 −206.41 −0.31
Average Field Size 11.45 12.00 −0.55 −0.29
Unpredictability Index Average 0.619 0.725 −0.11 −0.26
Win Favourite Success Rate 0.347 0.322 0.025 0.13
Place Favourite Success Rate 0.625 0.596 0.029 0.13
Note: All estimates in the last two columns are significantly different from zero at the
0.1% level.
and bettor payoff variables for this purpose. As the last column of Table 2
reveals, race stakes are strongly negatively correlated with bettor payoffs and
positively correlated with favourite success rates (again at the 0.1% level or
better).
At the same time, however, both field size and race unpredictability are
(i) greater on average in the low-stakes races, and (ii) negatively correlated
with race stakes. Thus, although the above results yield the conclusion that
betting payoffs are negatively related to race stakes, consistent with the view
that bigger financial incentives induce greater effort and better performance
from trainers, this relationship could be due to the negative relation between
stakes and the two control variables. To disentangle these effects, I employ
multivariate regressions that allow me to estimate the relation between race
outcomes and stakes while controlling for these other factors.
3 STAKES AND RACE OUTCOMES
I estimate regression models of the general form
y = α0 + α1(ln race stake) + α2(field size)
+ α3(unpredictability index) + ε (1)
In some specifications, the dependent variable y equals the natural log
of one of the three betting payoff variables. In other specifications, y is an
indicator variable: either (i) set equal to 1 if the win pool favourite wins
and 0 otherwise, or (ii) set equal to 1 if the place pool favourite finishes in
the first three and 0 otherwise. The first set of models are estimated by
ordinary least squares with White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard
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errors; the second set of models are estimated using maximum-likelihood
logit regression.
I also estimate a version of (1) that incorporates fixed effects for each
race track. Some tracks may be configured in such a way (e.g., smaller,
with tighter and less contoured bends) that racing luck is more important at
those venues, thereby resulting in a greater number of unexpected outcomes
and higher average betting payoffs. To the extent that such a phenomenon
is more likely to arise on tracks used by small racing clubs that primarily
run low-stakes races, the estimated coefficient on race stake will be upwardly
biased. To alleviate this problem, I include a dummy variable for each of the
26 tracks on which at least 150 races were held over the sample period.
3.1 Full-sample results
I initially estimate (1) using the full sample of 30426 races and present the
results in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 summarises the results of regressions that
use one of the three betting payoff measures as the dependent variable, while
Table 4 focuses on favourite success rates.
Table 3 shows that there is a strong negative relation between race
stakes and bettor payoffs. On average, a doubling of the race stake is associ-
ated with an 8.2% decrease in the win payoff, a 9.9% decrease in the quinella
payoff, and a 13.8% decrease in the trifecta payoff. Allowing for fixed-track
effects reduces the magnitude of these relationships, but the change is mi-
nor (the stake elasticities in the models with fixed effects are approximately
90% of those described above). And regardless of model specification, the
estimated relationship is statistically significant at the 0.1% level.
One way of assessing the economic significance of these results is to
estimate the predicted dollar impact on bettor payoffs of going from a low-
stakes to a high-stakes race, holding all else equal. Specifically, I set the
control variables equal to their respective sample means and then allow the
race stake to go from its 20th percentile value to its 80th (approximately
a 90% rise in stake). As shown in the last row of Table 3, this lowers the
predicted win payoff by $0.35, the quinella payoff by $1.45, and the trifecta
payoff by $29.05 (approximately 6%, 7% and 10% of their respective sample
medians). Allowing for fixed-track effects results in slightly smaller impacts.
As expected, the control variables have a strongly positive impact on
bettor payoffs, with all coefficients being significant at the 0.1% level. Re-
flecting the idiosyncratic nature of bets that rely on the success of a single
horse, the explanatory power of the model is greater for the more exotic bets:
the R2 for the trifecta payoff is 0.22, but this falls to 0.07 for the win payoff.
Table 4 shows that there is also a significant positive relation be-
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Table 3: Regressions of Betting Payoffs on Race Stakes: Full
Sample
Dependent Variable
Win Win Quinella Quinella Trifecta Trifecta
Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff
Intercept 1.447 1.455 1.872 1.812 3.582 3.506
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15)
Ln Race Stake −0.082 −0.075 −0.099 −0.090 −0.138 −0.125
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Field Size 0.084 0.083 0.174 0.176 0.283 0.286
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unpredictability 0.064 0.057 0.091 0.099 0.122 0.128
Index (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.15 0.22 0.22
Fixed-Track Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Quantitative Impact −$0.35 −$0.25 −$1.45 −$1.35 −$29.05 −$26.40
of Higher Race Stake
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses; all coefficient
estimates are significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level. The final row calculates
the predicted impact on betting payoffs of going from the 20th stake percentile to the 80th.
tween race stake and the probability of favoured-horse success: the win pool
favourite has an approximately 5.5% greater chance of succeeding in a race
in the 80th stake percentile than in a race in the 20th stake percentile; for
the place pool favourite, the corresponding margin is approximately 2.5%.
Again, these estimated relationships are statistically significant at the 0.1%
level, with and without track fixed effects.
One possible concern with these results is that race stake is simply
acting as a proxy for race prestige. That is, any differential effort on the
part of trainers is motivated not by financial incentives but instead by the
desire to achieve the fame and peer recognition associated with training the
winner of a major race. Like most developed racing industries, NZ harness
racing awards ‘Group’ status to its feature races, with Group 1 being the
most important. Thus, to check the robustness of the stake effect, I create
a dummy variable set equal to 1 if and only if the race is a Group 1 event
and include this both directly and as an interaction with the stake variable
in the above models. Because of the similarity of these results to those
appearing in Tables 3 and 4, I do not provide them in tabulated form.
In summary, although Group 1 races do tend to be more predictable, this
effect is insignificant at conventional levels. Moreover, controlling for high-
prestige races has essentially no effect on the other coefficients, including,
most importantly, those for the race stake variable.
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Table 4: Regressions of Betting-Favourite Success Rates on
Race Stakes: Full Sample
Dependent Variable
Win Favourite Win Favourite Place Favourite Place Favourite
Success Success Success Success
Intercept −0.806 −0.905 1.038 1.100
(0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22))
Ln Race Stake 0.131 0.119 0.100 0.090
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Field Size −0.080 −0.077 −0.116 −0.117
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Unpredictability −0.132 −0.100 −0.137 −0.140
Index (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
PseudoR2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Fixed-Track Effects No Yes No Yes
Quantitative Impact 5.80% 5.31% 2.55% 2.30%
of Higher Race Stake
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses; all coefficient
estimates are significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level. The final row calculates
the predicted impact on the probability of the favourite succeeding of going from the 20th
stake percentile to the 80th.
3.2 Do high-stakes races induce more effort from train-
ers, or do they just provide more information for
bettors?
The results in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with the view that financial
incentives matter for experts such as horse trainers: a low race stake induces
more trainers to exert less-than-full effort in preparing their horses, thereby
making the information possessed by bettors less useful in handicapping the
race, and hence, all else equal, making it less likely that bettor-favoured
horses will succeed. However, there is an obvious alternative explanation for
the results: a race with a low stake may be one in which bettors have less
information about the abilities of the horses involved, and hence they are less
able to handicap such a race. According to this view, races with the lowest
stakes are those in which bettors are least informed, so any relation between
race stakes and the success of bettor-favoured horses may simply reflect this
information effect, and have nothing to do with trainer responses to financial
incentives.
Bettors may have more and better information in high-stakes races
for at least two reasons. First, such races are typically restricted to more
experienced horses (since qualification requires some minimum level of prior
performance) who have a longer racing history and hence offer more informa-
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tion about their abilities to bettors. Second, racing media coverage is often
greater for higher-stakes races, particularly when these are held in major
population centres.
I attempt to control for bettor information effects by re-estimating
equation (1) using sub-samples that increasingly eliminate low-information
races. First, all races that were restricted to, or were primarily designed for,
horses that had previously won no more than one race are excluded from the
sample. This reduces the sample to 8133 races. Second, all races that were
restricted to two year old horses and those that were held outside the two
principal race tracks in Auckland and Christchurch are also excluded.9 This
results in a total of 3368 races. In this way, I restrict the sample to just those
races involving experienced horses at meetings receiving the most extensive
media coverage. Variation in the amount of information available to bettors
should be minor in these races.
Tables 5 and 6 contain the results from estimating (1) using these sub-
samples. If anything, the relationship between race stake and realised bettor
payoffs (Table 5) is even stronger than in the full sample: for example, a
doubling of the race stake is now associated with a 19% decrease in the
trifecta payoff, compared with 14% in the full sample.10 The relation between
race stakes and bettor-favourite success (Table 6) is similarly affected: the
estimated coefficients are all 50-100% greater than in the full-sample results
of Table 4. And although the standard errors are also larger, all coefficient
estimates for the stake variable remain significant at the 0.1% level. Thus,
it seems unlikely that my earlier results are due to unobserved differences in
the information available to bettors.
The results in Tables 5 and 6 also provide some reassurance about
a potential endogoneity problem. Suppose there are actually two types of
trainer: those who rarely exert less-than-full effort (“good”), and those who
often do so (“bad”). If, as seems plausible, the former are also higher-quality
trainers on average (i.e., have the greatest skills, knowledge etc), then they
are most likely to be entrusted with clients’ best horses, which subsequently
race primarily in high-stakes races. In this case, the results in Tables 3
and 4 could simply indicate that low- and high-stakes races are dominated
by different trainer types, not that individual trainers respond to the financial
incentives offered by different stakes. However, restricting the sample to races
9Since these two tracks are all-weather – and hence not grass – the maximum value of
the Unpredictability Index in this analysis is 2.
10One possible reason for this is that the excluded races are likely to have lower betting
turnover on average. As a result, betting by informed insiders is a greater proportion of
the betting pool, thus weakening the relationship between race stake and the propensity
for surprise outcomes. Another possibility is that such races are dominated by trainers
who specialise in - and exert maximum effort in - low-stakes races.
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Table 5: Regressions of Betting Payoffs on Race Stakes: Sub-
samples
Sub-sample A (n = 8132) Sub-sample B (n = 3368)
Dependent Variable
Win Quinella Trifecta Win Quinella Trifecta
Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff
Intercept 1.576 2.144 3.820 1.721 2.032 3.948
(0.14) (0.18) (0.23) (0.21) (0.27) (0.32)
Ln Race Stake −0.107 −0.141 −0.191 −0.118 −0.122 −0.192
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Field Size 0.095 0.188 0.311 0.091 0.181 0.301
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Unpredictability 0.078 0.113 0.140 0.068 0.154 0.159
Index (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
R2 0.09 0.18 0.28 0.07 0.15 0.24
Notes: Sub-sample A excludes all races restricted to horses that have previously won
no more than one race; sub-sample B also excludes all races for two year-old horses
and all races conducted outside the two major metropolitan tracks located in Auckland
and Christchurch. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses; all
coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level.
Table 6: Regressions of Betting-Favourite Success Rates on
Race Stakes: Sub-samples
Sub-sample A (n = 8132) Sub-sample B (n = 3368)
Dependent Variable
Win Favourite Win Favourite Place Favourite Place Favourite
Success Success Success Success
Intercept −1.086 0.389 -1.225 -0.143
(0.35) (0.36) (0.50) (0.52)
Ln Race Stake 0.183 0.185 0.168 0.216
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Field Size −0.100 −0.129 −0.078 −0.106
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Unpredictability −0.150 −0.175 -0.086 −0.237
Index (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
PseudoR2 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Note: See Table 5.
involving experienced horses at major tracks eliminates most “bad” trainer
entries, since the low-quality horses prepared by these trainers will not be
eligible to appear in such races. If there is something to the trainer-type
story, then the results from such a restricted sample should be considerably
different to those generated by the full sample. The absence of any such
difference suggests that trainer-type effects are unlikely to be driving the
relationship between race stake and the propensity for surprise outcomes.
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4 STAKES AND RACE ODDS
The results of section 3 are what one would expect to find if trainer effort,
and hence the quality of performance, responds to variation in stake levels.
However, other explanations may also be possible, so additional evidence is
desirable. One possible source of such evidence is the setting of odds by
bettors.
Suppose that trainers do indeed provide better quality services to clients
whose horses race in high-stakes races that offer greater potential trainer
remuneration. Then, as discussed in previous sections, the propensity for
“unexpected” outcomes should be greater in low-stakes races because such
races are more strongly associated with variation in trainer effort that is un-
observable to bettors. But rational bettors will be aware of this problem, and
hence adjust their odds accordingly. In particular, the risk of observed differ-
ences in horse ability being offset by unobserved differences in trainer effort
should cause bettors in low-stakes races to be relatively wary of favourites
and to “keep safe” longshots. That is, although a horse in a low-stakes race
may look clearly superior to its rivals, bettors will keep in mind the possi-
bility that the trainer may be exerting less-than-full effort in this particular
race and hence allow the horse to start at more generous odds than they
otherwise would. Similarly, a horse that, on past performance, looks clearly
inferior may nevertheless attract relatively strong bettor interest because bet-
tors cannot discount the possibility that the trainer has prepared the horse
more carefully for this race than for its predecessors. By contrast, in high-
stakes races where all trainers are likely to exert maximum effort, these risks
are less of an issue for bettors, who can thus be more certain in their odds
setting.
This suggests an additional test of the proposition that trainers re-
spond to the financial incentives associated with variation in race stakes: if
the quality of trainer service increases with race stake, then the dispersion of
race odds should be higher in high-stakes races than in low-stakes races. In
low-stakes races, the risk of a surprise outcome due to unobservable variation
in trainer effort results in “even” betting where many horses offer relatively
similar odds. By contrast, the greater certainty of high-stakes races encour-
ages bettors to set odds that better reflect the range of horse abilities.
Investigation of this idea requires odds data for every horse (or combi-
nation of horses) in the betting pools run on each race, information which
is not recorded in the Harness Racing New Zealand database. However, a
private, hand-collected, dataset covering 4416 races held between December
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Table 7: Summary Statistics for Measures of Odds Dispersion
Variable Mean Min Median Max
(Standard Deviation)
Volatility ($) 24.26 3.63 23.25 79.45
(10.19)
Range ($) 76.36 10.05 72.35 232.25
(33.30)
Proportion of Races 0.193
with Strong Favourite
2004 and November 2006 is available for this purpose.11 For each race, this
dataset contains the final win pool odds of every horse who competed in that
race.12
Utilising these data, I calculate three measures of odds dispersion.
First, the standard deviation of odds. Second, the difference between the
highest odds and the lowest odds.13 Third, a binary variable set equal to 1
if there is a “strong favourite” in the race (i.e., a horse offering even odds or
less) and 0 otherwise.
As Table 7 shows, approximately 19% of races have a strong favourite,
while the average race has an odds standard deviation of $24.30 and an
odds range of $76.40. However, there is considerable variation around these
average values. To investigate whether this variation is related to differences
in race stake, I again use multiple regressions that include the field size and
unpredictability index control variables (since a large number of competitors
increases the potential range of odds on offer while high unpredictability
makes it more likely that betting will be evenly spread) and report the results
in Table 8.
As would be expected if higher stakes motivate uniformly higher effort
amongst trainers, bettors set more dispersed odds in high-stakes races. On
average, a 10% higher stake leads to a 10.3 point rise in the standard deviation
of race odds, a 28 point increase in the odds range, and a 6.6% increase in
the likelihood of there being a strong favourite, all of which are statistically
significant at the 1% level.
Although these results are consistent with bettors recognising the greater
risk of less-than-full trainer effort in low-stakes races, there is another possible
interpretation: that high-stakes races primarily contain experienced horses
whose abilities have been more fully revealed to bettors, thereby providing
11I am grateful to Phil O’Connor for providing me with these data.
12Horse odds are equal to the promised payoff minus one, e.g., a horse offering a $50
payoff for a $1 bet is at odds of $49-to-1.
13For example, if the favourite horse in a race is at odds of 2-to-1 while the rank outsider
is offering 100-to-1, then the odds range is 98.
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Table 8: Regressions of Betting Odds on Race Stakes
Dependent Variable
Volatility Volatility Range Range Strong Strong
Favourite Favourite
Intercept −7.918 −11.148 −38.319 −47.896 −1.813 −1 .232
(2.64) (3.65) (8.25) (9.84) (0.58) (0.77)
Ln Race Stake 1.030 2.802 0.424
(0.28) (0.87) (0.06)
Ln Race Stake – 1.375 3.824 0.362
High Experience (0.39) (1.21) (0.08)
Ln Race Stake – 1.444 4.031 0.347
Low Experience (0.42) (1.32) (0.09)
Field Size 2.070 2.054 7.930 7.882 −0.269 −0.265
(0.06) (0.06) (0.19) (0.19) (0.02) (0.02)
Unpredictability −2.881 −2.865 −8.426 −8.378 −0.638 −0.641
Index (0.20) (0.20) (0.64) (0.64) (0.07) (0.07)
R2 0.19 0.19 0.25 0.25 0.09† 0.09†
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses; all coefficient
estimates except those in italics are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. †
denotes a Pseudo–R2
the latter with greater confidence about their ability to assess the field. In
low-stakes races by contrast, the true ability of the majority of horses is more
uncertain, so bettors are more cautious about letting any horse pay too lit-
tle or too much. To check that this is not driving the results, I designate
each race in the sample as catering either for experienced horses or for in-
experienced horses and then repeat the above regression models estimating
separate stake coefficients for each group.14 The results of these specifica-
tions also appear in Table 8 and reveal that the estimated coefficients for
Ln Race Stake are essentially the same regardless of the experience levels of
horses in a race. Stronger priors about variation in horse ability do not seem
to be the source of the relationship between odds dispersion and race stake.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
On the one hand, experts can be expected to advance their own financial
interests by, for example, favouring their most profitable clients. On the
other hand, experts are more likely than other workers to be subject to pro-
fessional pride considerations that motivate them to treat all clients equally.
However, very little is known about the way in which experts respond to these
14The results appearing in Table 8 are based on the criterion used to generate sub-
sample A of Section 3.2. Adopting the more restrictive sub-sample B criteria yields similar
findings.
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competing incentives. In this paper, I show that even though the potential
financial gain is relatively small, racehorse trainers appear to favour clients
whose horses compete in higher-stakes races: such races are characterised
by lower average returns to successful bettors, and higher favourite-success
rates, than are low-stakes races, consistent with more trainers exerting full
effort in the former than in the latter. Moreover, odds dispersion is greater in
high-stakes races, consistent with rational bettors recognising the incentives
faced by trainers and incorporating this insight in race odds.
A likely objection to this conclusion is that low-stakes races simply offer
less information to bettors, which leads directly to less predictable outcomes
regardless of any trainer incentive effects. Against this, I offer a crucial piece
of counter-evidence: eliminating races that involve only the most inexperi-
enced horses leaves the above results unaffected. Nevertheless, information
effects may vary with race stake in a manner not captured by this process,
so some caution is advisable.
One possible implication of these results is that the agency conflict
between owners and trainers is at least partly resolved by higher trainer
returns to performance – above some critical stake level, the expected payoff
to the trainer outweighs the potential gains from effort-diverting activities.
Nor is it necessarily replaced by a more severe conflict between trainers and
the owners of horses that race for low stakes: such clients may, at least
in some cases, be willing to tolerate a lower level of service today in the
expectation that they will be favoured when and if they come to own a horse
that races for high stakes.
Finally, the results of this paper may also have implications for the lit-
erature on the efficiency of horse race betting markets. In a study of United
Kingdom thoroughbred racing, Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997) find lit-
tle evidence of betting inefficiency in high-quality races – which presumably
offer relatively high stakes – but stronger evidence in other races. Similarly,
Weisbach and Paul (2008) report that the favourite-longshot bias is a feature
of United States greyhound races for maiden dogs, but not otherwise. Both
sets of authors argue that these differences may be due to the provision of
greater information and media coverage in higher-quality races, but my re-
sults suggest another possibility: that higher-quality races are less susceptible
to bettor error caused by unobservable variation in trainer effort.
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